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(decided December 30, 1993)
The petitioners, parents of New York City public school
students, commenced an action to prevent the implementation of
a condom distribution program that was initiated as part of an
overall Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) education program in New York
City's public high schools. 502 The petitioners challenged the
condom availability program on two independent constitutional
grounds. 503 First, they alleged that the implementation of the
program was a violation of the parent's substantive due process
right to direct the upbringing of their children in accordance with
their liberty interest found in both the State504 and Federal505
Constitutions. 506 Second, they alleged that the program violated
the parent's right to the free exercise of religion, also protected
by both the State507 and Federal508 Constitutions. 509 The court
501. 195 A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1993).
502. Id. at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
503. Id.
504. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The provision states in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
505. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The provision states in pertinent part:
"No state shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." Id.
506. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
507. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. The provision states in pertinent part: "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination... shall forever be allowed in this state to all mankind ..
Id.
508. U.S. CONST. amend I. The provision states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] .... " Id.
509. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261. The parent
petitioners also challenged the condom availability program as a violation of
Public Health Law § 2504, claiming that the program "constitutes 'health
services' to unemancipated minor children without the consent of their parents
1994]
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failed to find an abridgment of the petitioners' rights to free
exercise of their religion. 5 10 The court did, however, hold that
the New York City School Board's plan to dispense condoms to
unemancipated minor children, without parental consent or an opt
out provision, violated the petitioners' civil rights under both the
state and federal substantive due process clauses.511
or guardians," and hence such a program would operate without legal
authority. Alfonso, 195 A.D. 2d at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261. Public Health
Law § 2504 provides:
1. Any person who is eighteen years of age or older, or is the parent
of a child or has married, may give effective consent for medical,
dental, health and hospital services for himself or herself, and the
consent of no other person shall be necessary.
2. Any person who has been married or who has borne a child may
give effective consent for medical, dental, health and hospital
services for his or her child.
3. Any person who is pregnant may give effective consent for
medical, dental, health and hospital services relating to prenatal
care.
4. Medical, dental, health and hospital services may be rendered to
persons of any age without the consent of a parent or legal
guardian when, in the physician's judgment an emergency exists
and the person is in immediate need of medical attention and an
attempt to secure consent would result in delay of treatment which
would increase the risk of the person's life or health.
5. Anyone who acts in good faith based on the representation by a
person that he is eligible to consent pursuant to the terms of this
section shall be deemed to have received effective consent.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 1993). This provision codifies
some of the exemptions to the common-law requirement of parental consent
for "'medical, dental, health and hospital services[s].'" Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d
at 51, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504
(McKinney 1993)). Since none of the established exemptions are applicable to
the petitioners' situation, the fact that the condom program was held to be a
health service, combined with the fact that there was no parental consent, led
the court to the conclusion that the program was operated without statutory
authority. Id. at 48, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
510. Id. at 59, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
511. Id. at 60, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268. As to the issue of whether or not the
New York City School Board had the statutory authority to implement a
condom distribution program without a parental consent requirement or an opt
out provision, the court held that since the program constitutes a "health
service" in accordance with Public Health Law § 2504 and since "[i]t is for the
904 [Vol 10
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The impetus behind the creation of the challenged condom
distribution program dated back to September, 1987, at which
time the New York State Commissioner of Education ordered
that all elementary and secondary schools include instruction
concerning HIV and the AIDS epidemic. 5 12 In late 1990, based
on statistics that suggested that New York City teenagers
accounted for 20% of the reported cases of adolescent AIDS in
the United States, despite only making up approximately 3% of
the teenagers in the nation,5 13 the then Chancellor of the New
York City Board of Education, Joseph Fernandez, recommended
expanding the existing HIV/AIDS educational program to include
instruction on the transmission and prevention of the virus.514
Congress or the Legislature, not the courts-and certainly not the State
Commissioner of Education or a board of education-to provide the exceptions
to parental consent requirements[,] ... [t]here is no specific authority for
[such a] program, no matter how commendable its purpose may be." Id. at 54-
55, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
512. Id. at 48, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (referring to N.Y. Co, P. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 135.3(b)(2),(c)(2)) (1992).
513. 195 A.D.2d at 50, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261. The statistics that the court
cited were provided by Dr. Margaret Hamberg, the Acting Commissioner of
the New York City Department of Health. Id. at 61, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268
(Eiber, J., dissenting). Doctor Hamberg also pointed out that "29% of all
AIDS cases in the United States are diagnosed in young adults between the
ages of 20 to 29 [and s]ince the disease has an 8 to 10-year latency
period... 'this statistic suggests that the majority of those persons must have
been infected as adolescents.'" Id. (Eiber, J., dissenting). The court,
acknowledging these statistics, pointed out that the supporters of the condom
distribution program feel that the program is "a legitimate and necessary part
of public school health education directed at control of a public health crisis."
Id. at 50, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261. However, the court also acknowledged the
concerns of opponents to the plan who fear that:
[Tihe condom availability component of the plan is tantamount to
condoning promiscuity and sexual permissiveness, and that the exposure
to condoms and their ready availability may encourage sexual relations
among adolescents at an earlier age and/or with more frequency,
thereby weakening their moral and religious values. [Opponents to the
plan] doubt the wisdom or the desirability of a public school system
engaging in what they view as a controversial social program peripheral
to the immediate task of educating children.
Id. at 50, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
514. Id. at 48-49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
19941 905
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Pursuant to the Chancellor's suggestion, the New York City
Board of Education voted to establish a two part expanded
HIV/AIDS Education Program in New York City's public high
schools. 5 15 The first portion of the expanded program involved
classroom instruction that was designed to expose students to the
methods of both transmitting and preventing HIV. 5 16 This
portion of the program had "a parental opt-out provision," but
was mandatory for those students whose parents did not elect to
use that opt-out provision since they were required to participate
in the curriculum. 5 17 The second portion of the expanded
program involved making condoms available to students who
requested them. 5 18 This portion of the program envisioned each
public high school having health resource rooms where students
who requested condoms would receive personal health guidance
counseling from trained professionals regarding the proper use
and the consequences of improper use of a condom. 5 19 Because
participation in this portion of the program was not required, no
penalties would be levied against students who did not utilize the
health resource rooms. 520 However, as the court noted, this
condom availability portion of the program had no parental
consent requirement nor any opt out provision.52 1 It is this
515. Id. at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
516. Id.
517. Id. The opt-out provision allowed parents the opportunity to keep their
children out of the classroom instruction provided that the parents gave the




521. Id. The dissenting opinion pointed out that after considering the
possibility of including a parental opt-out provision in the condom availability
portion of the program, the Board decided against inclusion of such a provision
since it "would be unwise because students whose parents disapprove of
premarital sexual relations may especially 'be in need of a place where they
can obtain condoms without having to account for any expenditures of funds or
having to identify themselves in order to get the condoms.'" Id. at 61-62, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 269 (Eiber, J., dissenting). For these reasons, the Board feared
that a parental opt-out provision "'would so seriously limit participation in the
program as to make it ineffective in reaching many of those students who most
need it.'" Id. at 62, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
906 [Vol 10
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portion of the New York City Board of Education's expanded
HIV/AIDS Education Program that the parent petitioners sought
to prohibit by challenging its constitutionality.
522
Due process accords parents a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in raising their children as they see fit.523 Once an
intrusion on this fundamental right has been demonstrated by the
petitioner the burden shifts to the state to prove that a compelling
state interest is involved and that the statute or program, in
question, is drawn narrowly enough such that the means are
522. Id. at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
523. Id. at 56, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe
Court recognized that, although not expressly stated in the Constitution, a
"right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152. The Court considered this
privacy right could "be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action," and in holding it applicable
to a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, reiterated
it's application to the fundamental right of parental control over child rearing
and education. Id. at 152-53; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925) (affirming the fundamental right of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control in holding
Oregon's Compulsory Education Act not reasonably related to a purpose
within the competency of the State). The Act required "every parent, guardian
or other person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight
and sixteen years to send him 'to a public school for the period of time a public
school shall be held during the current year' in the district where the child
resides." Id. at 530; Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the
Court upheld the liberty right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment that empowers parents to control the education and
upbringing of their children, when it construed a Nebraska statute, making it a
misdemeanor for any person to "teach any subject to any person [who has not
yet completed the eighth grade] in any language other than the English
language," to be "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within
the competency of the State." Id. at 397, 403. In reversing the conviction of a
parochial school instructor who, in German, taught the subject of reading to a
pupil who had not yet completed the eighth grade, the Court held that both
"[h]is right.., to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
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necessary in achievement of the compelling interest. 524 The
Alfonso court found that "the petitioners enjoy [this] well-
recognized liberty interest in rearing and educating their children
in accord with their own views."525 Specifically, this parenting
right protects the petitioners' ability to "influence and guide the
sexual activity of their children without State interference." '526
Given this fact, the court applied the compelling state interest
test, 527 and found that there is no question that "'the State has a
compelling interest in controlling AIDS ... [and] in educating its
youth about AIDS.' ' 52 8 Therefore, the next determination to be
made was whether the state interference with petitioner's
fundamental right to raise a child free of interference was
necessary to achieve the desired end, that is, control of the AIDS
epidemic. 529 Specifically, the Alfonso court inquired whether it
can be said that "absent the [condom availability] program
challenged by the petitioners, sexually active students, educated
by the schools to the danger of sexually transmitted diseases, will
524. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 56, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265; see also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (holding that an "interest of sufficient
magnitude" must be put forth when the State "impinges on fundamental rights
and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children"); In re Marie B., 62 N.Y.2d 352,
358, 465 N.E.2d 807, 810, 477 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (1984) (reaffirming that
"[f]undamental constitutional principles of due process and protected privacy
prohibit governmental interference with the liberty of a parent to supervise and
rear a child except upon a showing of overriding necessity").
525. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 56, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265 (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6).
526. Id. at 56, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
527. Id. at 58, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
528. Id. at 53, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 263 (quoting Ware v. Valley Stream High
Sch. Dist., 75 N.Y.2d 114, 128, 550 N.E.2d 420, 429, 551 N.Y.S.2d 167,
176 (1989)). The Alfonso court stated that not only does the state have a
compelling interest in controlling AIDS but since "'[e]ducation regarding the
means by which AIDS is communicated is a powerful weapon against the
spread of the disease and clearly an essential component of our nationwide
struggle to combat it[,]'" the state also has a compelling interest in educating
it's youth about the epidemic. Id.
529. Id. at 58, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
908 [Vol 10
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be unable to acquire condoms without difficulty?" 530 Since, as
the court noted, there existed several alternative means by which
minors could obtain condoms, "[tihe answer [to this inquiry]
must clearly be no." 53 1 Hence, since the condom availability
component of the School Board's program was not so narrowly
tailored such that it could be deemed necessary to the
achievement of the recognized compelling state interest, the
majority held that the challenged program "violate[d] the
petitioners' constitutional due process rights to direct the
upbringing of their children."
532
The dissent in Alfonso presented a strong counter-argument to
the majority's due process analysis. 533 The dissent attempted to
530. Id. at 58, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
531. Id. The court cited as an alternative source of condom availability for
minors, "publicly funded nonschool programs where condoms are available to
minors as part of confidential family planning, as provided under the Social
Security Act and Public Health Service Act." Id. Likewise, given the decision
in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), where the U.S
Supreme Court held that a state has no significant interest sufficient to enact a
"blanket prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to minors," id. at
693-94, the Alfonso court acknowledged the relative ease with which a minor
may obtain condoms at a local drug store or convenience store. 195 A.D.2d at
58, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267. Finally, the court states that the School Board's
condom availability program could coexist without contravening due process
guarantees by simply "allowing parents who are interested in providing
appropriate guidance and discipline to their children to 'opt out' by instructing
the school not to distribute to their children without their consent." Id.
532. Id. at 59, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
533. Id. at 65-71, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 271-75 (Eiber, J., dissenting). The
dissent also criticized the majority for deeming the condom program a health
service subject to Public Health Law § 2504. Id. at 63-64, 606 N.Y.S.2d at
270 (Eiber, J., dissenting). As the dissent reasoned, "if the distribution of
condoms is a 'health service' which cannot be undertaken without parental
consent, then the many family planning clinics throughout this state which
distribute condoms and other contraceptive devices to minors must also be
deemed in violation of the common law and statute." Id. at 65, 606 N.Y.S.2d
at 271 (Eiber, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent argued that to impose a
parental consent requirement on the condom availability program would run
afoul of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Carey. Id. at 64, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 270 (Eiber, J., dissenting). See Carey, 431 U.S. at 693-94
(holding that since "the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting
1994] 909
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undermine the majority's reliance on federal precedent by
distinguishing the school board's condom availability program
from the situations in Meyer v. Nebraska534 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.535  According to the dissent, the element of
"compulsion" that supported the Meyer and Pierce decisions was
absent in the present case.
536
The petitioners in Alfonso also raised a challenge to the
condom availability program pursuant to their right to free
exercise of their religious beliefs. 537 The Free Exercise
Clause538 protects against impermissible government regulation
of religious beliefs. 539 The threshold question to be asked in a
procreation extends to minors as well as adults[,]" the state may not impose "a
blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors").
534. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
535. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
536. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 67, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 272. The dissent pointed
out that "the mere fact that parents are required to send their children to school
does not vest the condom distribution program with the aura of 'compulsion'
necessary to make out a viable claim of deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional right." Id. "Unlike Meyer, where a state attempted to totally
prohibit parents from permitting their children to study a foreign language until
after completion of the eighth grade, or Pierce, where a state attempted to
prohibit parents from sending their children to private parochial schools," the
Alfonso dissent claimed that "the element of compulsion is totally absent
here ... [since the petitioners are free to impart their religious and moral
values to their children in the privacy of their own homes, and to instruct their
children not to participate in the condom distribution program." Id.; see also
Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980). In
Doe, the parents of a 16 year old girl, who received contraceptives from a
publicly operated family planning clinic which did not require parental
notification, challenged the distribution of such products.as a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right of parental control. Id. at 1163. In
distinguishing the parent's reliance on Meyer and it's progeny, the majority
pointed out that the state, through the clinic, "merely established a voluntary
birth control clinic ... [with] no requirement that the children of the plaintiffs
avail themselves of the services offered by the [clinic] and no prohibition
against the plaintiffs' participating in decisions of their minor children on
issues of sexual activity and birth control." Id. at 1168.
537. 195 A.D.2d at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
538. U.S. CONST amend. I; N.Y. CONST art. I, § 3.
539. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981) (holding that the state's denial of unemployment
910 [Vol 10
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free exercise claim is whether the government regulation places
any burden upon the claimant's free exercise rights. 540
Specifically, the primary focus "'in identifying an
unconstitutional burden is whether the claimant has been denied
the ability to practice his religion or coerced in the nature of
those practices.'" 5 4 1 In addressing the threshold question, the
Alfonso court determined that no constitutionally-prohibited
benefits to the petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness who terminated his job in a
machinery fabrication plant because his religious beliefs forbade participation
in the production of turrets for military tanks, constituted a violation of his
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 399-402 (1963) (holding that South Carolina violated the petitioner's
right to free exercise of religion when it disqualified her from unemployment
benefits because she refused to take a job that required her to work on
Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her church, the Seventh-day Adventist Church);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding that since the First
Amendment prohibits compelled affirmation of those religious beliefs which
are repugnant, the state could not deny a public office to a person solely
because of the person's refusal to profess a belief in God). But see
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the free
exercise clause did not prohibit the State of Oregon from applying its drug
laws to the use of peyote in religious ceremonies).
540. See Sherbert, 398 U.S. at 403; see also Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he first
question to be decided is whether a governmental requirement that a person be
exposed to ideas he or she finds objectionable on religious grounds constitutes
a burden on the free exercise of that person's religion as forbidden by the First
Amendment").
541. See Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 59, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (quoting Rector,
Wardens -and Members of the Vestrey of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of
N.Y., 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
In St. Bartholomew's Church, the petitioner challenged New York City's
Landmarks Law, which prohibited the Church from demolishing one of its
buildings designated as a landmark without the approval of the Landmarks
Preservation Commission, as facially violative of its free exercise of religion
right in that it "impaired the Church's ability to carry on and expand the
ministerial and charitable activities that are central to its religious mission." Id.
at 353. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Landmarks Law
presented no burden of constitutional proportion on the petitioner "absent a
showing of discriminatory motive, coercion in religious practice or the
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burden was placed on the parent petitioners by the school board's
condom program. 542 The condom availability program was found
to exert neither compulsion 543 nor coercion 544 upon petitioners
or their children 545 because there were no sanctions nor criminal
liability for failure or refusal to participate. 546 Further, the
petitioner's mere objection to the condom programs contrary to
their religious beliefs did not rise to the level of a constitutional
burden inconsistent with the free exercise clause.
547
Hence, while the condom availability portion of the School
Board's HIV/AIDS educational program did not run afoul of the
petitioner's state and federal free exercise rights, the program
did, in light of the Alfonso majority's interpretation of state and
542. 195 A.D.2d at 59, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
543. Id. at 60, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268. See, e.g., Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065.
The Mozert court held that the school board's inclusion of material in
elementary school reading courses that petitioner, a born again Christian,
found objectionable was not violative of her free exercise right. Id. The court
reasoned that because, unlike Sherbert and Thomas, the element of compulsion
was not present, hence absent a showing that requisite course "participation
entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or performance or non-
performance of a religious exercise or practice," no unconstitutional burden
was placed on petitioner. Id.
544. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 60, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268. See, e.g., Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 404. The Sherbert court found that the state's denial of
unemployment benefits to petitioner based on her religious conviction against
working on Saturdays was unconstitutionally coercive since such denial of
benefits "forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." Id.
545. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 60, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
546. Id. at 59, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The court reasoned that "[tihe
petitioners' contention that the students are 'bombarded' with information
respecting the program, and that they may be tempted to succumb to peer
pressure, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Id.
547. Id.; see also Smith v. North Babylon Union Free Sch, Dist., 844 F.2d
90, 93 (2d Cir. 1988) ("In a pluralistic society such as ours it is impossible for
government to accommodate every need of every religious group."); Grove v.
Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1542 (9th Cir.) (holding that if "the
free exercise clause violated whenever governmental activity is offensive to or
at variance with sincerely held religious precepts, virtually no governmental
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federal substantive due process protection, abridge petitioner's
fundamental right to rear and educate their children as they saw
fit.54 8 Based on this holding, the School Board was "prohibited
from dispensing condoms to unemancipated, minor students
without the prior consent of their parents or guardians, or
without an opt-out provision."
549
Manshul Construction Corp. v. New York City School
Construction Authority550
(decided April 19, 1993)
Plaintiff asserted that his rights to due process and equal
protection were violated under the New York State55 1 and
Federal 552 Constitutions when he was denied the opportunity to
bid on construction contracts based on his failure to meet
established prequalification requirements. The court held that
neither the plaintiff's rights to due process nor equal protection
were violated. 55
3
In this case, the plaintiff brought an article 78 proceeding to
review the determination by the defendant that the plaintiff did
not satisfy the prequalification requirements necessary to bid on
contracts. 554 This proceeding was an appeal by the plaintiff from
a prior federal action litigated between the same parties which
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs causes of
action.555
548. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 60, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
549. Id.
550. 192 A.D.2d 659, 596 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2d Dep't 1993).
551. N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 11. Section 6 provides in relevant part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id. Section 11 provides in relevant part: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." Id.
552. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
relevant part: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ." Id.
553. Manshul, 192 A.D.2d at 659-60, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 476.




et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
In the case at hand, the appellate division referred to the federal
district court's decision, which held that the plaintiff's due
process rights were not violated, and stated that the plaintiff was
therefore collaterally estopped from relitigating his claims of due
process violations. 55 6 In referring to the federal district court's
analysis of plaintiff's due process claims, the appellate division
explained that the district court applied New York State law and
cited Economico v. Village of Pelham.557 In Economico, the New
York Court of Appeals stated that in order to determine whether
an individual has a liberty or property interest, it is necessary to
examine the applicable state law. 55 8 The court applied the
relevant state law and held that the failure to afford plaintiff a
hearing was not a violation of due process. 559
More recently, in Dentom Transportation, Inc. v. New York
City Human Resources Administration,560 the state supreme court
applied relevant state law in examining plaintiff's claims of due
process violations. 56 1 The court reasoned that the defendant was
not required to provide a hearing to the plaintiff and held that the
plaintiff's due process rights were not violated. 562 The court
further held that the defendant was not obligated to give the
busing contract to the plaintiff.563 Similarly, in Conduit and
556. Id.
557. 50 N.Y.2d 120, 405 N.E.2d 694, 428 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1980). In
Economico, the plaintiff was a tenured employee who was absent from his
work for eighteen months due to injuries he sustained in a non work-related
accident. Id. at 124, 405 N.E.2d at 695, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 214. Due to the
plaintiffs absence, the defendant's board of trustees terminated his
employment. Id. As a result, the plaintiff filed an article 78 proceeding against
the defendant claiming that he suffered due process violations because he was
not given a hearing prior to his dismissal. Id. at 124, 405 N.E.2d at 696, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 215.
558. Id. at 125, 405 N.E.2d at 696, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
559. Id. at 128, 405 N.E.2d at 698, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
560. 155 Misc. 2d 31, 588 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1992).
561. Id. at 37, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 717. The plaintiff, as a result of having its
bid previously rejected by the City Comptroller, brought an article 78
proceeding to require the city to award the plaintiff a busing contract. Id. at
32-33, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
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Foundation Corp. v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority,564
the court applied the relevant state corporate law and determined
that, based upon good reason, any contract bid could be
rejected.565 The court further stated that "[n]either the low
bidder nor any other bidder has a vested property interest in a
public works contract. .. "566 Accordingly, the court held that
the plaintiff's due process rights were not violated.
567
Federal case law is in agreement with New York State case law
in that state law should be applied when determining whether
procedural due process rights have been violated because a
liberty or property interest existed. In Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth,568 the Supreme Court explained that the
Constitution does not create property interests. 5 69 Instead, the
Court stated, such interests are defined by state law or existing
rules.570 The Court applied state law, which left to the discretion
of the University whether or not to rehire a teacher. 57 1 Based on
the above, the Court held there was no due process violation
564. 66 N.Y.2d 144, 485 N.E.2d at 1005, 495 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1985).
565. Id. at 148, 485 N.E.2d at 1008, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
566. Id. at 148-49, 485 N.E.2d at 1008, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The court of
appeals noted further:
Although the power to reject any or all bids may not be exercised
arbitrarily or for the purpose of thwarting the public benefit intended to
be served by the competitive process, the discretionary decision ought
not to be disturbed by the courts unless irrational, dishonest or otherwise
unlawful.
Id.
567. Id. at 150, 485 N.E.2d at 1009, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
568. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The plaintiff was hired as an assistant professor
at Wisconsin State University for one year and after his term expired he was
not rehired. Id. at 566. The plaintiff was given no reason why he was not
rehired nor was he given a hearing in order to challenge the decision. Id. at
568. The plaintiff claimed his procedural due process rights were violated
because he was denied a hearing. Id. at 569. However, the Court disagreed
with plaintiff's assertions and stated that he did not have a property or liberty
interest which would warrant a hearing. Id. at 579.
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because plaintiff had failed to "show[] that he was deprived of
liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
572
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in White Plains Towing
Corp. v. Patterson,573 followed the reasoning of Roth by
applying state law in examining whether a liberty or property
interest existed in claims of due process violations. 574 In White
Plains Towing Corp., the court had to determine whether there
had been a violation of due process where State Police terminated
a towing company's contract which provided towing services for
Interstate Route 287 in Westchester County. 575 To this end, the
Second Circuit applied the reasoning set forth in Roth, and stated
that in determining whether the plaintiff had a property right in
the continued employment, "a plaintiff 'must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.' ' 576 Thus, the court found that under
New York State law, the informal relationship which existed
between the parties did not create a "property right[] protected by
due process." 577 Additionally, the court held that "plaintiffs had
572. Id. at 579.
573. 991 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 185 (1993).
574. Id. at 1062. "Under New York law, a contract for services that makes
no specific provision for duration is presumed to be terminable at will." Id.
575. Id. at 1052-53. The court stated that "[a]n interest that state law
permits to be terminated at the whim of another person is not a property right
that is protected by the Due Process Clause." Id at 1062.
576. Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
577. Id. The court stated:
The parties stipulated that the ... system for assigning segments of I-
287 to towing operators was 'not specifically authorized by, or codified
in any statute or in any regulation of the State Police,' that these
assignments were 'not contractual in nature' that the assignments were
'not specifically licensed or issued permits by the State Police to operate
or to provide services under the . . . dispatch system.'
Id.; see also S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 969-70 (2d
Cir. 1988). The court stated:
In the absence of a contractual or state law entitlement to prompt
payment, we need not consider whether a prompt payment right, if
otherwise established, could be interfered with, without some form of
916 [Vol 10
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no cognizable property interest in continued towing referrals
... and the mere termination of their status ... did not deprive
them of a due process-protected interest." 5 78
The plaintiff in Manshul also asserted an equal protection
claim579 alleging that he was not allowed to bid on contracts for
the defendant. 580 However, the appellate division dismissed
plaintiff's claim and explained that the plaintiff was trying to
relitigate the same issue which had already been decided in
federal district court, thus the plaintiff was collaterally estopped
from relitigating this claim. 58 1 The court further stated that in
order for equal protection to apply under either state or federal
law, there must be state action.582
due process protection, by the State's power to defer payment pending
an investigation to determine legality.
Id.
578. White Plains Towing Corp., 991 F.2d at 1062.
579. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. The court stated that it has "held that the
Equal Protection Clause in the New York State Constitution... is no broader
in coverage than its Federal counterpart, and this equation with the Federal
provision extends to the requirement of 'State action' in order for the Equal
Protection Clause to be applicable. Id. (citations omitted).
580. Manshul, 192 A.D.2d at 660, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
581. Id.
582. Id.; see also Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 60, n.6,
482 N.E.2d 1, 7, n.6, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522, 528, n.6 (1985) (stating that the
Equal Protection Clause under the State and Federal Constitutions are the same
in coverage and both require state action in order for the Clause to be
applicable); Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 313-14, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094
452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (1982) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause under
the State Constitution is not broader than its federal counterpart); Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 981 (1950) (stating that it is necessary to determine whether
the Equal Protection Clause under the New York State Constitution is broader
than the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution); McDermott v. Forsythe, 188 A.D.2d 173, 177, 594
N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (3d Dep't 1993) (holding that the establishment of different
dates for reclassification of new civil service titles was not a violation of equal
protection); Shattenkirk v. Finnerty, 97 A.D.2d 51, 55, 471 N.Y.S.2d 149,
153 (3d Dep't 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 62 N.Y.2d 949, 468 N.E.2d
53, 479 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1984) (stating that the Equal Protection Clauses under
the State Constitution and its federal counterpart were equal).
1994] 917
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The federal courts have also interpreted the Federal and State
Equal Protection Clauses to grant many of the same rights. In
Burka v. New York City Transit Authority,583 the plaintiffs who
were drug abusers alleged that they suffered equal protection
violations under both the Federal and the New York State
Constitutions. 584 They "claim[ed] that they "[were] not afforded
the same protection as other disabled employees, such as alcohol
users .... "585 Specifically, "[t]hey contend[ed] that they [were]
treated differently than others (alcohol users) similarly situated
within the class, and that such disparate treatment bears no
rational relationship to the [defendant's] stated objectives. "586
The court dismissed the plaintiff's federal claim stating that there
existed a rational relationship between the Transit Authority's
drug screening program and "its policy ... designed to help
ensure a safe and dependable public transit system." 587 As to the
plaintiff's state equal protection claim, the court noted that "the
equal protection clauses of the United States and New York
constitutions are coextensive[,] ' 588 thus mandating the dismissal
of this claim. 5 89
Thus, as to both the due process and equal protection claims
asserted in Manshul, both the state and federal courts appear to
be in agreement as to their handling of the issues presented.
T.E.A. Marine Automotive Corp. v. Scaduto 590
(decided December 27, 1993)
Appellant claimed that publication of a tax lien sale violated his
right to due process as provided in the State59 1 and Federal 592
583. 680 F. Supp 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
584. Id. at 601-02.
585. Id. at 601-03.
586. Id. at 602. The "policies in issue [in this case] prohibit[ed] drug use,
requir[ed] drug testing, and disciplin[ed] or refusled] to hire those who test[ed]
positive [for drug use] . . . ." Id. at 603.
587. Id. at 602-03.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. _ A.D.2d _, 607 N.Y.S.2d 47 (2d Dep't 1993).
918 [Vol 10
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Constitutions. 593 This action was brought pursuant to an article
78 proceeding594 to vacate a tax deed assessed against the
appellant. 595 The appellate division held that written notice was
not violative of the Due Process Clause of both the State and
Federal Constitutions. 596
In McCann v. Scaduto,597 the New York Court of Appeals
held that "where the interest of a property owner will be
substantially affected by an act of government, and where the
owner's name and address are known, due process requires that
actual notice be given." 598 Furthermore, the court of appeals
concluded that a "tax lien sale ... creates 'momentous
consequences' for the homeowner and that - balanced against
these consequences - requiring that a notice be mailed to a
person whose name and address are known imposes a minimal
burden on the County. Actual notice is therefore required." 59 9
Thus, noting that appellant's title to the subject property was
valid, the court reasoned that due process was "not offended by
the fact that the municipal[ity] ... mailed written notice of the
tax lien sale to the same address as that to which the Receiver of
Taxes of the Town of North Hempstead had consistently been
sending the actual tax bills." 60 0
591. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
592. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in relevant part: "No person shall...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 similarly provides that "[n]o state shall...
deprive to any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law ...."
593. T.E.A., A.D.2d at , 607 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
594. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 7801-06 (McKinney 1981 and Supp. 1994).
595. T.E.A., _ A.D.2d at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 47
596. Id. at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
597. 71 N.Y.2d 164, 519 N.E.2d 309, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1987).
598. Id. at 176, 519 N.E.2d at 314, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
599. Id. at 177, 519 N.E.2d at 314-15, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (citation
omitted).
600. Id. at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
1994] 919
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Moreover, in ISCA Enterprises v. City of New York, 60 1 the
court of appeals held that a municipality satisfied the minimum
requirements of due process when it mailed notices of a tax lien
sale to the names and addresses contained in a tax assessment
record. 60 2 Additionally, in Anthony v. Town of Brookhaven,603
the appellate division ruled that a municipalities' "use of its
current assessment roll as the source of the names and addresses
of property owners was appropriate under the
circumstances .... [T]he assessment roll constitute[d] a
comprehensive and generally accurate compilation of property
ownership .... "604
The federal judiciary has dealt with the requirement of proper
notice. For example, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust605 the United States Supreme Court held that "[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."' 606 This standard for
notice was applied to a tax lien proceeding in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams.607 In Mennonite, the Court ruled that
"[w]hen the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly
recorded, constructive notice by publication must be
601. 77 N.Y.2d 688, 572 N.E.2d 610, 569 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1263 (1992).
602. Id. at 701-02, 572 N.E.2d at 616-17, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 933-34.
603. 190 A.D.2d 21, 596 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2d Dep't 1993).
604. Id. at 28, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 463. The case involved the rezoning of real
property, where notice was given by publication and mail. Id. at 22, 596
N.Y.S.2d at 459.
605. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
606. Id. at 314. In Mullane, the mere publication of judicial settlements was
deemed an inadequate form of notice because the names and addresses of the
beneficiaries entitled to such settlements were known, and providing personal
notice by mail would not have created an undue hardship. Id. at 318.
607. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known
available address, or by personal service." 608
Most recently, in Weigner v. City of New York, 60 9 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals used the Mullane standard in a
foreclosure proceedings. 610 In Weigner, appellant owned real
property and failed to pay taxes for more than four years. 6 11 By
receiving bills and letters from the City relating to her
delinquency, appellant knew foreclosure was pending. 6 12 The
court held that "notice by ordinary mail supplemented by
publication and posting was reasonably calculated to inform the
parties affected. Due process does not require that notice sent by
first class mail be proven to have been received. "613
In conclusion, New York and federal case law are in accord on
what type of notice is required for a tax lien proceeding to satisfy
due process. Both require actual notice be mailed when the names
and addresses of the parties are known to the municipality.
Unification Theological Seminary v. City of Poughkeepsie
6 14
(decided February 7, 1994)
The plaintiffs claimed that the single family zoning ordinance
of the City of Poughkeepsie 615 was unconstitutional because it
608. Id. at 798 ("Until 1980 ... Indiana law did not provide for notice by
mail or personal service to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for
nonpayment of taxes.").
609. 852 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1988).




614. __ A.D.2d ,607 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1994).
615. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE § 19-2.2 (1990). Definition of a Family:
(a) One (1), two (2) or three (3) persons occupying a dwelling
unit; or
(b) Four (4) or more persons occupying a dwelling unit and
living together as a traditional family or the functional
equivalent of a traditional family.
(2) It shall be presumptive evidence that four (4) or more persons
living in a single dwelling unit who are not related by blood,
1994]
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violated the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution. 616  At issue was the ordinance's rebuttable
presumption that a household of more than three unrelated
persons is not functionally equivalent to a traditional family. 617
The supreme court held the zoning ordinance constitutional and
the appellate division affirmed. The decision rested on two
propositions: First, that zoning ordinances cary a presumption of
constitutionality; 618  and second, that a valid rebuttable
presumption can save an otherwise facially invalid ordinance
from being declared unconstitutional. 619
The presumptive validity of zoning ordinances was originally
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1926, in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 620 In a case of first impression, the
Court held that an ordinance may only be declared
unconstitutional if its "provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." 621 That decision included the
finding that it is a permissible governmental objective to enact
zoning ordinances that restrict land usage to single family
marriage or legal adoption do not constitute the functional
equivalent of a traditional family.
(3) In determining whether individuals are living together as the
functional equivalent of a traditional family, the following criteria
must be present: ... [the code then lists four such criteria, (a),
(b), (c), and (d)]
(e) Any other factor reasonably related to whether or not the
group is the functional equivalent of a family.
Id.
616. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, which provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
617. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE, § 19-2.2. This section provides in
pertinent part: Family (2) "It shall be presumptive evidence that four (4) or
more persons living in a single dwelling unit who are not related by blood,
marriage or legal adoption do not constitute the functional equivalent of a
traditional family."
618. A.D.2d at , 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
619. Id.
620. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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dwellings in order to maintain safe, quiet, low traffic
neighborhoods. 622 This aspect of the holding is the prevailing
rule of law in both state623 and federal decisions. 624 Thus,
subsequent due process challenges to zoning ordinances have,
like the case at hand, focused primarily on whether the means
employed by the municipality bears a substantial relation to the
permissible objective.
Since the concept of "single family" residence has consistently
been viewed as part and parcel of the permissible governmental
objective,625 it is not surprising that the definition of family has
become the prime focus of attention. In Baer v. Town of
Brookhaven,626 the New York State Court of Appeals held that,
622. Id.'at 394 (stating that apartment houses can be characterized as
approximating a nuisance when built in detached sections).
623. See City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313
N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974) ("By requiring single family
use of a house, the ordinance emphasizes and ensures the character of the
neighborhood to promote the family environment. . . . Thus the city has a
proper purpose in largely limiting the uses in a zone to single-family units.");
Group House v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 271, 380
N.E.2d 207, 209, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1978) ("It is now settled law that a
community may appropriately limit the use of certain neighborhoods to single-
family residences."); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 549,
488 N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 131 (1985) ("Indisputably, this
ordinance was enacted to further several legitimate governmental purposes,
including preservation of the character of traditional single-family
neighborhoods, reduction of parking and traffic problems, control of
population density and prevention of noise and disturbance.").
624. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) ("The city
seeks to justify [this single family dwelling unit ordinance] as a means of
preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and
avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland's school system.
Although these are legitimate goals, the ordinance before us serves them
marginally, at best."); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
The town "restricted land use to one-family dwellings . . . ." Id. The Supreme
Court held that "[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one. . . ." Id. at 9.
625. See, e.g., Group House, 45 N.Y.2d at 271, 380 N.E.2d at 209, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 379 ("It is now settled law that a community may appropriately
limit the use of certain neighborhoods to single-family residences.").
626. 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989).
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in order to pass due process review, a zoning ordinance may not
impose numerical limits on households composed of unrelated
individuals that are more restrictive than those imposed on
households composed of related individuals. 627 It should be noted
that this is a higher degree of protection against zoning
restrictions than that afforded by federal decisional law. In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas628 the Supreme Court upheld an
ordinance that placed no limitations on the size of households in
which the people were related by "blood, adoption, or
marriage," but which limited the number of unrelated individuals
"living ... as a single housekeeping unit" to two. 629
In Unification Theological Seminary the plaintiffs did not
challenge the city's purpose in enacting the zoning ordinance in
question. 630 Rather, they sought to have the city code declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that the means chosen by the city
was not rationally related to that purpose. 63 1 They based their
argument on the fact that the code clearly placed a greater
627. Id. at 943, 537 N.E.2d at 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
In McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240,
498 N.Y.S.2d 128 [(1985)] we addressed the constitutionality of a
zoning ordinance which limited the number and age of unrelated persons
who could dwell in a single-family home to two persons, 62 years of
age or older. We held that the ordinance was invalid because it imposed
a restriction on the number of unrelated persons residing together as a
functionally equivalent family but imposed no such restriction on related
persons. Such differentiation, we said, was not reasonably related to a
legitimate zoning purpose and, therefore, violated the State Due Process
Clause.
Id.
628. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
629. Id. at 2. The issue was peripherally revisited in Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) where the Supreme Court held an ordinance
unconstitutional because it restricted the nature of related individuals who
could comprise a single family. Id. at 518. Specifically, the ordinance
prevented a grandmother from including in her household two grandchildren
who were cousins and not brothers. Id. In reaching its decision the Court
discussed case law in the various states, acknowledging that the states have
tended to provide greater protection for the individual rights of homeowners.
Id. at 518.
630.__ A.D.2d at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
631. Id. at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
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restriction on the number of unrelated persons who may reside
together than on the number of related individuals who may
reside together. 632 However, the appellate division held that the
city code was not unconstitutional because the restriction633 was
in the form of a valid rebuttable presumption. 63 4 Thus, the fact
that the city provided the plaintiffs with the opportunity to make
a defense, according to factors specified in the code, 635 saved it
from being held invalid. 63
6
State and federal case law provide "that a rebuttable
presumption involving the imposition of civil penalties.. . is
valid if there is a rational connection between the facts proven
and the facts presumed, and there is fair opportunity for the
opposing party to make his defense." 637 This rule of law dates
back to the seminal New York State case, Board of
Commissioners v. Merchant,638 wherein the court of appeals held
that:
so long as the legislature, in prescribing rules of
evidence,... leaves a party a fair opportunity to make his
defense, and to submit all the facts to the jury to be weighed by
them, upon evidence legitimately bearing upon them, it is
632. Id. at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
633. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE §19-2.2 (2).
634. _ A.D.2d at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384. ("A rebuttable presumption
is valid if there is a rational connection between the facts needed to be proven
and the fact presumed, and there is a fair opportunity for the opposing party to
make his defense.").
635. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE §19-2.2, (3)(e).
636. A.D.2d at , 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
637. Casse v. New York State Racing and Wagering Bd., 70 N.Y.2d 589,
595, 517 N.E.2d 1309, 1311, 523 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (1987); see also Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 28 (1975) (stating that as long as
there is a rational connection between the presumption and the fact proved, the
presumption does not constitute a due process violation); Sigety v. Leventhal,
42 N.Y.2d 953, 367 N.E.2d 644, 398 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1977) (upholding the
presumptive evidence rule based on the rational connection between the
presumption and the facts proved).
638. 103 N.Y. 143, 8 N.E. 484 (1886).
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difficult to perceive how its acts can be assailed upon
constitutional grounds. 639
In summary, both state and federal law apply a rational basis
test when reviewing the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance.
The rational basis test holds that such an ordinance is
constitutional so long as it was enacted to pursue a legitimate
governmental interest and there is a rational relationship between
the interest pursued and the means selected for the purpose.640
The state has determined that an ordinance will fail the rational
relationship prong of the test if it is more restrictive with regard
to unrelated individuals than it is with regard to related
individuals. 64 1 Federal case law has held that restrictions on
unrelated individuals in excess of those on related individuals can
be upheld. 642 Thus, an ordinance that is upheld in the face* of a
New York State due process claim is unlikely to be struck down
by a federal court, though the converse does not necessarily hold
true. Finally, the constitutionality of the use of a rebuttable
presumption to make an otherwise invalid ordinance valid, has,
to date, only been dealt with under the state law, and only at the
appellate level. On the other hand, under federal law, the city's
639. Id. at 148, 8 N.E. at 485.
640. McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 549, 488 N.E.2d
1240, 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130-1 (1985). The court stated that:
In order for a zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police
power it must survive a two-part test: (1) it must have been enacted in
furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) there must be
a 'reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved by the
regulation and the means used to achieve that end'
Id. (citation omitted); see also City of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926) (holding that in order to be declared unconstitutional, an
ordinance must be "arbitrary and unreasonable" and have "no substantial
relation to [the police powers]".)
641. See Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 943, 537 N.E.2d
619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989) (holding that an ordinance which "restricts the
size of a functionally equivalent family but not the size of a traditional family"
violated the state constitution).
642. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding an
ordinance that did not limit the number of related individuals who could
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ordinance would probably have passed the rational basis test even
if it had totally forbidden four or more unrelated persons from
living together in a single family residence. 643
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Hilard v. Coughlin 111644
(decided February 3, 1993)
Petitioner, prison inmate, claimed that his state645 and
federal 64 6 constitutional rights to procedural due process were
violated when Respondents denied his request to examine the
videotapes and photographs reviewed by the Hearing Officer at
his disciplinary proceeding. 647 The third department held that the
denial of petitioner's request to reply to evidence used against
him "implicated only the right to confrontation and cross
examination" 648 since he was denied his regulatory right to reply
to evidence against him.649 The court further held that the
evidence played a substantial role in the finding of guilt, and that
the explanations as to why petitioner could not examine the
evidence did not adequately enunciate "institutional safety and
inmate privacy considerations." 650  Accordingly, the court
granted petitioner a new hearing. 6
5 1
643. Id.
644. 187 A.D.2d 136, 593 N.Y.S.2d 573 (3d Dep't 1993).
645. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
646. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
647. Hillard, 187 A.D. at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
648. Id. at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
649. Id. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. V11, § 254.6(c) (1992).
When an inmate is served with a misbehavior report a hearing is conducted,
and N.Y.C.R.R. provides that "[t]he inmate... may reply orally to the
charge and/or evidence and shall be allowed to submit relevant documentary
evidence or written statements on his behalf." Id.
650. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (quoting Bernier v.
Mann, 166 A.D.2d 798, 799, 563 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (3d Dep't 1990)).
651. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
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Petitioner, an inmate at Southport Correctional Facility in
Cheming County, was served with a misbehavior report. 652 The
report resulted from petitioner's participation in the takeover of
an outdoor exercise yard in the prison.653 Specifically, the
misbehavior report alleged violations of the Department of
Correctional Services' rules on rioting654 and leaving an assigned
area without authorization. 655 At the disciplinary hearing,
petitioner requested permission to view photographs and
videotapes which were taken during the riot, however, his
request was denied. 656 Subsequently, petitioner was found guilty
on both charges. 657 In support of his finding, the Hearing Officer
cited to the misbehavior report, the testimony of prison officials,
and the videotapes in question. 658 Following unsuccessful
administrative review, petitioner brought this C.P.L.R. article
78659 proceeding to annul the determination on the grounds that
his constitutional right to procedural due process had been
violated because, inter alia, Respondent denied his request to
examine the videotapes of the riot.66
0
The court held that petitioner's regulatory right to reply to the
evidence was violated, reasoning that the videotapes played an
652. Id. at 137, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
653. Id.
654. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. VII, § 270.2(B)(5)(i) (1989).
Department of Correctional Services rule 104. 10 provides in pertinent part that
"[inmates shall not conspire or take any action which is intended to or results
in the takeover of any area of the facility.. . ." Id.
655. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. VII, § 270.2(B)(10)(ii) (1989). Department of
Correctional Services rule 109.11 provides that "[i]nmates shall not leave an
assigned area without authorization." Id.
656. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 137, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
657. Id. at 138, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
658. Id.
659. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. art. 78 (McKinney 1991).
660. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The court noted
that there was substantial evidence in support of finding Petitioner guilty. Id.
In addition, the court quickly dismissed Petitioner's arguments that the
misbehavior report did not adequately describe the misconduct and that due
process was denied by Respondent's failure to record a session. Id. at 138-39,
593 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
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essential role in finding him guilty, and that the reasons for
refusing his request to examine the evidence did not adequately
articulate "institutional safety and inmate privacy
considerations." 66 1 The court noted that although constitutional
rights are diminished in the disciplinary hearing context, 662
inmates should be permitted to call witnesses and present
evidence when institutional safety will not be unduly
threatened. 663 If, however, disclosure of evidence is deemed to
be hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, such
evidence may remain confidential despite the Hearing Officer's
reliance on it in rendering a decision. 664 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that if documents are to remain confidential, the
evidence must be "'submitted to the reviewing court for in
camera inspection [and] the hearing officer must, at the time of
the hearing, inform the inmate that he will consider certain
information which will remain confidential and articulate some
reason for keeping the information confidential.'" 665
In Hillard, the court observed that Respondent had alerted
petitioner to the fact that the videotapes would be considered and
informed him that he could not view the tapes because "other
inmates [were] there." 666 Nonetheless, if petitioner had been able
to examine the videotapes, he could have identified himself on
the tape and negated any adverse evidence used against him. 667
Hence, the court concluded that the videotapes played an
661. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (quoting Bernier v.
Mann, 166 A.D.2d 798, 799, 563 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (3d Dep't 1990)).
662. Id. at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (citing Volff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 560 (1974)).
663. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575; see also Amato v.
Ward, 41 N.Y.2d 469, 472-73, 362 N.E.2d 566, 569, 393 N.Y.S.2d 934, 936
(1977).
664. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
665. Id. (quoting Boyd .v. Coughlin, 105 A.D.2d 532, 533, 481 N.Y.S.2d
769, 770 (3d Dep't 1984). The Hillard court stated that "[c]oncerns for
institutional safety may rationally be invoked to defend limitations on
prisoners' constitutional rights... provided the request is reasonably related
to legitimate security interests'" Id. (citations ommitted).
666. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
667. Id. at 139-40, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575-76.
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important role in the Hearing Officer's finding that petitioner was
guilty. 668 Moreover, the explanations as to why petitioner could
not examine the evidence did not adequately articulate
"institutional safety and privacy considerations." 669
Consequently, the Court held the petitioner had been denied his
regulatory right to reply to the evidence against him and
accordingly, granted petitioner a new hearing. 670
Inmate procedural due process rights in the federal realm is
delineated in Wolff v. McDonnell.67 1 In Wolff, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether procedural due process right
guarantees extend to inmates while participating in disciplinary
668. Id. at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576. Compare Boyd v. Coughlin 105
A.D.2d 532, 534, 481 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (3d Dep't 1984) (although Hearing
Officer should have informed Petitioner of reasons for confidentiality error
was harmless since documents were irrelevant).
669. Id. (quoting Bernier v. Mann, 166 A.D.2d 798, 799, 563 N.Y.S.2d
158, 159 (3d Dep't 1990)). Compare Pinargote v. Berry, 147 A.D.2d 746,
748, 537 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (3d Dep't 1989) (advising Petitioner that
identification of informant would jeopardize his safety is an adequate
explanation) and Odom v. Kelly, 152 A.D.2d 1010, 543 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812
(4th Dep't 1989) (Petitioner not entitled to information regarding informant's
identity and testimony because confidentiality was necessary to protect
inmate's safety).
670. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court declined
to endorse expungement as an appropriate remedy. Id
Expungement is required only when (1) the challenged disciplinary
determination is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) there has been a
violation of one of the inmate's fundamental due process rights as enunciated
in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 [(1974)] ... ; or (3) other equitable
consideration dictate expungement of the record rather than remittal for a new
hearing. Id.
As to the first precondition, the court observed that the Hearing Officer's
determination is supported by substantial evidence. Id. The second element is
not satisfied because Petitioner's request to examine the videotapes involved
the right to confrontation and cross-examination, which the Supreme Court
expressly excluded from inmate due process rights. Id. As to the third
prerequisite, the court concluded that equity does not require expungement. Id.
Thus, the court ruled that a new hearing, and not expungement, is the
appropriate remedy in this case. Id. See also Freeman v. Coughlin, III, 138
A.D.2d 824, 825-26, 525 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (3d Dep't 1988) (new hearing
granted where Petitioner was not given an explanation for confidentiality).
671. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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hearings. 672 The Court ultimately decided that inmate
disciplinary hearings do not demand all of the procedural due
process rights guaranteed in probation and parole revocation
hearings. Specifically, inmates participating in inmate
disciplinary hearings are not entitled to the right to confront or
cross examine witnesses. 673 Nor are inmates guaranteed the right
to counsel at such hearings. 674 According to the Supreme Court,
allowing these procedures would disrupt the prison setting and
cause resentment among prisoners. 675 The Court reasoned that
special circumstances surround inmate disciplinary hearings,
including the fact that these hearings "take place in a closed,
tightly controlled environment" an that they "involve
confrontations between inmates and authority and between
inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge
or furnish evidence against them." 676 Because prison officials
closely supervise and control inmate activities, courts must give
deference to prison officials' disciplinary decisions so as to
promote inmate respect for prison officials. 677 Consequently, it
was the culmination of these factors which weighed heavily in the
Court's decision to deny extending the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination to inmates in disciplinary hearings.
However, the Court did hold that certain minimum procedural
requirements include at least twenty-four hour advance written
notice of the hearing on the claimed violation, an opportunity to
be heard, a conditional right to call witnesses and present
evidence unless doing so would jeopardize prison security, or
correctional goals, and a written statement detailing the evidence
relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action. 678 In the event
that a prison official refuses to allow an inmate to call a witness
at a disciplinary hearing, they must provide an explanation,
however, they may do so on the record during the hearing or in
672. Id. at 553.
673. Id. at 567-68.
674. Id. at 570.
675. Id. at 567-70.
676. Id. at 567-68.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 563-67.
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court if the denial is subsequently challenged. 679 Furthermore,
the explanations for denying permission to present witnesses must
be logically related to institutional safety or correctional goals.680
In conclusion, New York law, in contrast to federal law, 681
provides an inmate with the procedural due process rights to
confrontation and to cross-examination while participating in
disciplinary proceedings. 682 Furthermore, in the event that such
requests are denied, prison officials are required to articulate a
rational basis for the denied requests. 683 While, the Supreme
Court has articulated certain minimum procedural requirements,
the right to confrontation and cross-examination as set forth in
New York constitutional law, are absent as a matter of federal
constitutional law.684
679. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985). The Court noted that the
additional administrative burden created by requiring contemporaneous reasons
would "detract from the ability to perform the principal mission of the
institution." Id. at 498.
680. Id. at 497.
681. Inmates' constitutional rights are implemented by the prison
regulations in New York State. Laureano v. Kuhlmann, 75 N.Y.2d 141, 146,
550 N.E.2d 437, 443, 551 N.Y.S.2d 184, 190 (1990).
682. Hillard v. Coughlin, 187 A.D.2d 136, 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576
(3d Dep't 1993).
683. Id.
684. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-68 (1974).
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